"Klasifikacja tipow techniczeskowo progressa i
acjmpticzeckije traektori ekonomiczeckowo rocta", Ekonomika i
matematichzskie metody (
A systematic explanation of the relationships between the different classifications of technical progress and their implications for the process of long-run growth.
"Technological Condition for Balanced Growth: a Criticism and Restatement", Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 1974, 2, pp.171-84 (with S. Gomulka).
Proves that, contrary to previous beliefs and an alleged theorem, labour augmenting technical progress is not a necessary conditions for steady growth.
"Tassi di crescita nel discreto e nel continuo di flussi e di fondi: una esposizione sistematica", Rivista internazionale di Scienze sociali, 91, 2-3, 1983, pp. 211-22; revised English version: "Rates of Growth of Stocks and Flows in Discrete and Continuous Time", in: Gerhard Fink, Günther Pöll and Martin Riese (eds.), Economic Theory, Political Power and Social Justice, Springer, Wien - New York 1987, pp. 173-189.
A systematic explanation of the relationships between the growth rates of macroeconomic variables in a continuous and in a discrete time framework.
"The Theory of Growth of a Socialist Economy of M. Kalecki", Economics of Planning, 11, 1971, 3, pp. 161-88 (reprinted in Malcom C. Sawyer (ed.), The Legacy of Michal Kalecki, vol. II, Edward Elgar, 1999).
An assessment of 1965 Kalecki’s theory of growth in a centrally planned socialist context. Its affinity, but not identity, with neoclassical growth models is explained.
M. Kalecki - Antologia di scritti di teoria
A comprehensive reconstruction of Kalecki’s economic theory in his own words, with a thorough introduction. Among the Polish works translated for the first time in a Western language there is Kalecki’s 1936 remarkable review article of Keynes’ General Theory. The introduction retraces the evolution of Kalecki’s macroeconomics from the original business cycle theory of 1933, to the imperfectly competitive context of 36-39, up to the mature versions of later years.
"Breit, Kalecki, and Hicks on the Term
Structure of Interest Rates, Risk and the Theory of Investment",
in M. Baranzini (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory.
Shows the origins of Kalecki’s 1937 celebrated "principle of increasing risk" in the Central European monetary theory of his age (including in particular an article of Hicks, published in German in 1933), as developed in the work of his old-time friend and colleague Marek Breit. In an article published in German in 1935 Breit had considered the issue of the structure of interest rates and credit in an imperfectly competitive framework, where individual supply curves of credit are increasing because of the growing risk of default.
"Kalecki's Quest for the Microeconomic
Foundations of his Macroeconomic Theory", in: M. Sebastiani (ed.), Kalecki's
Relevance Today, McMillan,
Considers the microeconomic foundations of Kalecki’s macroeconomic theory, from the early thirties to the late seventies. In particular, analises the conditions under which, in an imperfectly competitive context, L-shaped cost functions at the micro level translate in an aggregate L-shaped supply function at the industry and macroeconomic level. The L-shaped supply function is of crucial importance for the construction of Kalecki’s macroeconomic theory, as well as for any other version of fixprice Macroeconomics.
“Kalecki's Theory of Income Determination and Modern Macroeconomics”, in: Zdzidlaw L. Sadowski e Adam Szeworski (eds.), Kalecki's Economics Today. London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 71-78. (Shortened version of: Kalecki's Theory of Income Determination: A Reconstruction and an Assessment: Repec Working Paper, 2003).
The paper considers the legacy for modern macroeconomics of Kalecki’s theory of income determination. The latter is reconstructed in its analytical constituent parts referring in detail to the original sources. The critical appraisal of its historical relevance is made from the vantage point of the specific strain of contemporary Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics that is also based, after a long historical gap, on imperfectly competitive microeconomic foundations. Important elements of Kalecki’s theoretical construction have been a lasting, even if usually unacknowledged, legacy to the toolkit of modern macroeconomics.
"La distribuzione del reddito nelle economie socialiste", Rivista internazionale di Scienze sociali, 82, 1974, 5, pp. 424-70.
A comprehensive analysis of the various determinants--economic, ideological, political--of income distribution under Soviet-type socialism.
"Growth Maximization, Egalitarianism and Wage Differentials in the Socialist Economy", Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 36, 1976, 2, pp. 319-32.
A mathematical model of the determination of the optimal wage and tax structure in a socialist economy in an efficiency wage framework, where the competing targets of the socialist planners are growth maximization and egalitarianism.
"Socialist and Communist Income Distribution in Marxian and Soviet Marxist Thought", Il Politico, 43, 1978, 4, pp. 698-710.
A study of the ideological basis of income distribution policies under Soviet-type socialism.
"Income Distribution under Soviet-type Socialism: an Interpretative Framework", Journal of Comparative Economics, 4, 1980, 1, pp. 1-18.
Studies the economic logic of the processes that govern income distribution of real personal incomes in a socialist economy by examining the allocative function of gross wages and the incentive function of workers’ real disposable incomes. Also considered are the differential effects on income distribution of paying workers straight time wages and incentive payments, and the distributive consequences of the organizational principles adopted in shaping the actual structure of the economy. Finally, the factors affecting inequality in the distribution of earnings under socialism and capitalism are compared.
politiche distributive nelle economie del socialismo 'reale'", in Claudio
De Vincenti e Marcella Mulino (a cura di), Il difficile sentiero della
Perestroika - Le economie dell' Est negli anni '80.
Considers the ends and means of distribution policies and the various aspects of primary and secondary distribution processes in the experience of "real" socialism.
"Distributional and Redistributional Processes in Soviet-type Economies and the Distributional Impact of Institutional Change", in: Camilo Dagum, Mario Zenga (eds.), Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty, Berlin, Springer Verlag 1990, pp. 389-403.
Considers the likely impact of transition on income distribution as a consequence of the alteration in the mechanisms of primary and secondary income distribution prevailing under the previous system.
"Comparisons of Income Distribution East and West, before and after Transition: Some Methodological Issues" Statistics in Transition (Journal of the Polish Statistical Association), 1, 1994, 5, pp. 641-653.
Considers the methodological difficulties affecting comparisons of distributional data before and after transition and how they can be overcome.
"The Right to Employment Principle and
Self-Managed Market Socialism: A Historical Account and an Analytical Appraisal
of Some Old Ideas", European University Institute Working Paper,
Considers the historical development of a specific non-Marxist brand of market socialism, dating back to the second half of last century, characterized by the open character of self-managed enterprises.
"Self-Managed Market Socialism with 'Free Mobility of Labor'", Journal of Comparative Economics, 10, 1986, 3, pp. 237-254.
Shows that, under standard assumptions, the long-run equilibria of open or closed self-managed enterprise economies are identical (and, because of a previous well-known result by Drèze, identical to the long-run equilibrium of the corresponding standard model of an economy of capitalist firms).
"Market Socialism: a Historical View and a Retrospective Assessment", Economic Systems, 16, 1992, 1, pp. 171-185.
Makes a retrospective assessment of market socialism, both in theory and in practice. Two main strands of the market socialist model are singled out, which differ in their fundamental attitude towards the nature of markets and competition. The reasons for the eventual failure of "real" market socialism, in the Yugoslav and Hungarian experiences, are also considered.
"At the Origin of Market Socialism: Dühring's ‘Socialitarian’ Model of Economic Communes and its Influence on the Development of Socialist Thought and Practice". Economic Analysis, vol. 2, n. 3, 1999, pp. 187-207.
The paper considers the influence of Eugen Dühring 1876 socialist (or, "socialitarian" according to his terminology) model of economic communes, which was amply discussed and criticized in Engels' AntiDühring, on the development of a peculiar non-Marxian stream of market socialist models. Dühring's model is seen to show remarkable similitude with Mao's organization of the Chinese economy. The influence through Oppenheimer on the initial institutional forms of Jewish settlements in Palestina is documented.
“The Lange-Breit Model, the Right to Employment and the Outside Option.” Zdzislaw Sadowski (ed.), Oskar Lange a wspolczesnosc, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego, 2005, pp.157-169.
A revisitation of the peculiar Breit-Lange model of 1934, where production was organized in large self-managed trusts. In order to break the market power and the restrictive tendencies of the latter, a peculiar institution was envisaged, that of workers’ right to become a member of the trust of his choice. I discuss in particular the following issues: where did Breit and Lange took this peculiar institution from? What would happen in a market economy, socialist or otherwise, in case of introduction of such an institution? As to the first question it turned out that the feature of employment on demand was typical, with different connotations, of a family of non-Marxian socialist models, following that of Marx’s arch-enemy Eugen Dühring. In Breit and Lange however an important aspect of these models is missing, the belief of the lack of justification of land rent and the belief that free access to land, unhindered by rent, could provide a kind of “outside option”, allowing to avoid both the miseries of unemployment and those of industrial employment, a sort of reversal of the process of expulsion from land following the enclosures. In the specific world of Breit and Lange, there no such a need, since full employment is automatically guaranteed, together with self-management, in the industrial economy. As to the introduction of some form of employment on demand providing a guaranteed outside option for the unemployed, this seems a fascinating idea, but one that could not work in practice because of the specificities of the employment relationship and of the consequences of imperfect and asymmetric information.
Report at the economic Conference of NATO in April 1990 on the first results of the Polish transformation process and on the impact of Western assistance, putting forward proposals for its further expansion.
"Il processo di trasformazione economica ed istituzionale nell' Est europeo: il caso polacco", in Economia e Finanza nell' ottica di una Europa Unita, special issue of Note Economiche n. 2, 1990.
A detailed report of the first ten months of Polish transformation
"Rules vs. Discretion in Economic Transition", Revue européenne des sciences sociales, Tome XXXI, 1993, n° 96, pp. 201-215.
The paper criticizes the dirigistic and constructivist approach used in devising and implementing institutional change in transitional economies and considers how this approach could be replaced with the liberal one of fixing general rules, avoiding the pitfalls of case by case decisions, in particular in the areas of privatization and social policies.
"The Exertion of Monopoly Power as a Cause of the Depression Following Institutional Transformation". Economic Systems, 20, 1996, 4, pp. 315-323.
Presents a simple explanation, based on the exertion of market power by state enterprises and faulty expectations, of the recessionary impact of price liberalization in the economies in transition.
“Dieci anni di transizione postcomunista in Europa centrorientale: un bilancio retrospettivo". Europa-Europe, vol. VII, 1999, n. 2, pp. 71-85.
A comprehensive assessment of the overall performance of transition economies in the first transition decade and of the successes, or rather failures, of transition policies.
"Privatisation through Competition". Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas, 14, 1990, 2, pp. 182-184.
Develops the concept that the most expedient way to privatize transitional economies may be to put the state sector in competition with the emerging private one. If the latter is more productive and grows faster and the same rules of the game and budget constraints apply to state and private enterprises alike, the privatization of the economy will be the outcome of an evolutionary process of survival of the fittest. In the process, state firms will have strong incentives to improve their performance.
"Privatization in Eastern European Transition: Economic Consequences of Alternative Privatization Processes", in Renzo Daviddi (ed.), Property Rights and Privatization in the Transition to a Market Economy. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1995, pp. 63-101. (Originally published as: "Property and Management Privatization in Eastern European Transition: Economic Consequences of Alternative Privatization Processes", EUI Working Papers RSC n. 94/12, San Domenico di Fiesole, 1994, pp. 1-42.)
A systematic study of the various ways of privatization in transitional economies, with some proposals. In order to speed up privatization, without giving away assets to the advantage of purchasers and financial disadvantage of the state, initially only a controlling minority of shares can be sold, turning residual state-owned shares into preferred shares without voting rights. In a second time the remaining shares may be gradually sold to the general public through remunerative auctions.
"Distributional Consequences of Privatisation in the Economies in Transition: An Analytical Framework", Moct-Most, 6, 1996, pp. 75-93.
Explains how privatisation processes lead to changes in the distribution of wealth. The main conclusions are the following ones: -Even when state assets are sold for what the market can bear, and thus apparently only exchanges of equivalent values are involved, privatisation generally leads to increased private wealth and enhanced inequality;-as a consequence of retrading this inequality enhancing effect is not necessarily smaller, but may be even greater when privatisation is relatively egalitarian in appearance, as, for example, in mass privatisation programmes; -in case privatisation brings about workers' control there is a tendency, if the opportunities for retrading are not restricted, for this control to be transient; -some aspects of privatisation processes can be understood as ways potential losers from transition and privatisation are compensated so as to maintain consensus.
"The Impact on Employment of Institutional
Considers the social consequences of transformation and the possible measures of social policy for dealing with them, making specific reference to the Polish case.
"On the Social and Economic Consequences of
Institutional Transformation in
Text of a report presented to the Transformationscolloquium
of the Werner-Reimers-Stiftung,
"Economic Transition and the Unemployment Issue", Economic Systems, n 17, 1993, 1, pp. 63-78.
Proposes a set of policy measures for dealing with the issue of
unemployment without hampering the working of the labour market, while
paying due attention to moral hazard problems. These measures are based on a
contractual framework between social partners and public authorities, aiming at
the reduction of labour costs for preserving employment. This corresponds to
the basic conception of the institution of "area
contracts", later introduced in
Considers Polish experiences of participation under the past system and the way their scope has been changed in the new one.
“Entrepreneurship and Transition”,
MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, 2001, Volume 11,
Number 4, pp. 327-357; republished in: Magnus Henrekson - Robin Douhan (eds.), The
Political Economy of Entrepreneurship, vol. II.
While output and employment in the overextended and overmanned state sector decrease, it is crucial for the success of transition that private entrepreneurship builds up, increasing production and employment, in a process somewhat paralleling the dual development Harris-Lewis-Todaro model, where the state sector plays the role of the traditional sector endowed with an almost unlimited reserve of labour. The way this takes place depends to a great extent not only on the specific features of the privatisation processes pursued, but also on the overall institutional and social conditions affecting the development, and the nature, of private entrepreneurship. In particular, under conditions of insufficient construction of the institutional framework of the market, and lack of prevention and punishment of fraudulent behaviour and self-dealing, the development of entrepreneurship can be derailed into unproductive and destructive forms, according to Baumol's distinction, with dire economic and social consequences. The different outcomes of the transition process may also be explained through the different preconditions affecting the severity of the specific impediments encountered in development of entrepreneurship. Some policy suggestions for speeding up this development, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, conclude the paper.
Economic Systems and Institutions
"L' economia di mercato con piena occupazione permanente e garantita, l' assunzione obbligatoria e la natura del contratto di lavoro", Rivista internazionale di Scienze sociali, n. 2, 1987, pp. 88-122.
Explores the functioning of a market economy with workers’ right to be hired by the firms of their choice at the employment conditions set by the latter. With full information and given standard assumptions the equilibria of a market economy with and without free access are identical, while the dynamic properties are quite different, since in the first case there cannot be, by definition, involuntary unemployment. This clearly shows that the difficult problem that unemployment poses for economic policy depends in an essential way on issues of imperfect and asymmetrical information.
“The Economic System as an End or as A Means and the Future of Socialism and Capitalism: An Evolutionary Viewpoint”. SSRN Electronic Paper Collection, March 2003, Revised version April 2012 (shorter version in Economic System vol. 26, 2002, pp. 401-407).
After the demise of “real” socialism and the decline of “western” socialism, socialism can be salvaged as a social preference system oriented towards equality and social justice, to be implemented without systemicconstraints in the organizational and institutional sense. At the same time there is a case for maintaining an institutional framework allowing different forms of economic organization, capitalist and noncapitalist, to compete on equal footing, in an evolutionary perspective, thus allowing the second to develop if proven efficient. Another way for a spontaneous extension of the domain of socialism could derive from the socialization of consumption, if the consumption f public goods continues to make up a growing component of real consumption.
“Cooordination, Cooperation, and the Extended Coasean Approach to Economic Policy”, in Michele Bernasconi and Massimo Marrelli (eds.), Diritti, Regole, Mercato: Economia Pubblica e Analisi Economica del Diritto. Milano: Franco Angeli, 2004, pp. 55-74
The Coasean way to deal
with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto inefficiency is to
remove or lessen the obstacles to cooperation through the attribution of
property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. The
relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties
to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the
number and indeterminacy of the interested parties, the cost and indeterminacy
of bargaining, and the free rider problem. A way to extend the Coasean approach
while taking into account those real life limitations is to consider the local
authorities as representatives of the interest of their local constituencies
and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to enhance
the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving
private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as
opposite to traditional remedial actions relying on non-contractual, or direct
entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of state
direct and coercive action a number of institutions emphasising the contractual
cooperation between public and private parties have effectively grown of
importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in
“Stakeholder Protection, Varieties of Capitalism, and Long-Term Unemployment”, in The European Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 9, 2012, n. 2, pp. 197-228
In the literature the issue of the protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) is usually considered in a static context: how should the institutions of corporate governance be shaped having regard to already existing firms, conforming, in particular, to some subjective criteria of fairness and fair play. It is remarkable that no attention is paid to the basic fact that a company in order to exist must first be established, and that the founders-owners are the original shareholders. Moreover not necessarily the most appropriate protection of stakeholder interests can be provided by the institutions and practice of corporate governance, specific kinds of legal provision may be more suitable. But rather than substitution complementarity prevails between different legal provisions protecting the interests of stakeholders (in particular employees) and the stakeholder protection afforded through the institutions of capital governance, conforming to the logic of the different "varieties of capitalism". An aspect of the latter that is emphasized in the paper, and is usually overlooked, are the much higher rates of long-term unemployment associated with the continental European variety as compared with the Liberal Market variety of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. But the Scandinavian Social-Democratic market model gives the best of both worlds: low long-term unemployment rates and incidence, together with high degrees of employment protection.
“Long-Term Unemployment in the Varieties of Capitalism”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2228497
Usually, when the attention is focused on the different performances of the labour market, the overall rate of unemployment is at the center stage. But this is misleading: while short term unemployment can be seen as physiological for the the working of the labour market, long-term unemployment is certainly pathological. The paper considers how the different varieties of capitalism affect the rate of long-term unemployment, rather than the aggregate rate. The liberal market variety, where employment protection is the lowest, presents lower rates of long-term unemployment than the continental European and the Mediterranean varieties. In the latter both employment protection and long-term unemployment are the highest and labour market participation the lowest. The socialdemocratic Scandinavian variety gets the best of both worlds: low rates of long-term unemployment, high rates of labour participation, lower degree of inequality, with relatively high levels of employment protection. However the Scandinavian model may be hardly applicable in countries, such as the Mediterranean ones, where a sizable part of public opinion apparently adheres to the various specifications of the “lump of something” economic fallacy. Low rates of long-term unemployment and high levels of labour participation are also produced by the far-Eastern Asian variety, but at the cost of a markedly dualistic labour market structure.
“On the Economics and Politics of Unrestricted Immigration”, Political Quarterly, no. 4, vol. 73, pp. 431-436, 2002
Any effective, rather than purely nominal, restriction on immigration is bound to have as a consequence the expulsion of those who are circumventing it. As long as any restriction on immigration remains, no distinction between groups of immigrants will solve the problem of expulsions and their inherent cruelty. Only unrestricted immigration would do that. This obvious logical consequence is usually either not considered or simply wilfully swept aside by those who protest against expulsions and restrictions on immigration. This short article sets out to consider, in a speculative way, what the consequences of unrestricted immigration might turn to be, both at the economic and at the social and political levels.
“The Long March of Italian Communists from Revolution to Neoliberalism: a Retrospective Assessment”. Il Politico, vol LXXV, n. 1 2010, pp. 99-120
The paper traces back the path that has transformed the Italian Cmmunist
Party from its original revolutionary stance into a democratic government
party, leading to a radical change in its original political outlook (and not
only of name). Its recent dissolution into a new political entity, to some
extent antithetic to its original ideological roots, has completed the process.
The changing nature of the party was reflected in the different roles performed
throughout the political and economic life of post-war
“Poverty and Development in Historical Perspective” pp. 1-58. SSRN and Repec working paper (a shortened version has been published in the The European Journal for Comparative Economics, vol. 7, n. 2, 2010, pp. 469-501)
Seen in historical perspective the main economic issues of the present world (such as poverty, inequality, backwardness) appear in a somewhat different light than in many current discussions. The achievements of the modern age, and in particular of the post-World War II period, are considered in the perspective of economic and demographic history, and in their relations with the contemporary systems of production and of international relations.
The paper considers the status of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the light of the new Financial Perspective 2007-2013 and of the present internal state of the European Union. Even if in theory the ENP could have been a valid substitute for enlargement, it does not seem to have reached its aim of providing an adequate surrogate for full membership. Considering the figures of the new Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the issue of market access, and the internal power dynamics of the EU, we see that it is hardly conceivable that the ENP could ever give to its neighbours the same economic advantages that membership gives to the poorer members of the EU. Another controversial aspect is the clear asymmetric nature of the ENP, whereby the payoff for neighbours is conditioned on their “good behaviour”, thus amounting to a form of soft imperialism. While ENP tries to establish a comprehensive and coherent framework of the EU’s relations with its neighbourhood, the actual behaviour of EU towards its neighbours is shown to present some inconsistences due to political expedience and pragmatic concerns. The consideration of some related basic issues of EU institutional reform, such as the weakening of the powers of the member states, or the introduction of some intermediate forms of partial membership, concludes the paper.
“Perspectives of the ENP, and Perspectives of the EU: Neighbourhood, Enlargement, and Unanimity”, Aussenwirtschaft, vol. 64, no. 3, September 2009, pp. 253-268.
The paper considers the state of the ENP policy in the framework of the present institutional impasse of the EU. Even if the Lisbon Treaty enters in force, an acceptable functioning of the EU with 27 members can hardly be compatible with the permanence of the unanimity vote for the most important decisions, such as budgetary issues or enlargement. Further enlargement under these circumstances can be seen both as difficult and ill-advisable: a higher number of members (and more heterogeneous) increases the probability that the requirement of unanimity may lead to disruptive strategic behavior.Thus enlargement of the market, and legal approximation, can best take place, realistically speaking, in the framework of ENP.At the same time the assistance to recognized prospective members, who probably will not be able to enter in the foreseeable future, could well perform a role not too different from that of ENP, amounting substantially to a kind of ENP in disguise.In both cases we have the use of the typical instruments for the preparation of enlargement, but with some different stated objectives, and a different framework for financial assistance. So long as enlargement seems concretely possible the prospect of membership may continue to have additional incentive effects.The momentum for reform may however be lost if eventually the process is seen as never-ending. Some greater approximation to membership status can be provided by an extended ENP policy, but it seems highly unlikely that the internal dynamics of the EU will allow even the most compliant of the neighbours to enjoy the same economic advantages of actual membership, as the paradigm of “everything but institutions” would imply.
“Stakeholders vs. Shareholders in Corporate Governance” (with Mirella Damiani), The Icfai Journal of Corporate Governance. Vol. IV, No. 4, October 2007, pp. 7-45.
The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context.